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 While there is some uncertainty regarding the proper standard of review1
under the circumstances presented here, see Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 198 n.7
(3d Cir. 1999), we need not resolve the issue here because we would affirm the decision
of the District Court even under the most demanding standard of review.  
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McKEE, Circuit Judge
United Federal Leasing, Inc. (“UFL”) appeals from an Order of Dismissal of the
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania that was entered pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.1
2I.
Inasmuch as we write only for the parties, we need not set forth the factual or
procedural background of this dispute.  Rather, we will proceed directly to our brief
discussion.  The doctrine of issue preclusion derives from the principle that “‘later courts
should honor the first actual decision of a matter that has been actually litigated.’” 
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine, 63 F.3d 1227, 1231 (3d
Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).  In order for the doctrine to apply, each of the following
conditions must be satisfied: 1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same as that
involved in the prior action; 2) the issue was actually litigated; 3) the issue was
determined by a final and valid judgment; and 4) the determination was essential to the
prior judgment.  Id. at 1231-32, (citing, In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir.
1992)).  
An issue is actually litigated when it is properly raised, by pleadings or otherwise,
is submitted for determination, and is determined.  O’Leary v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., 923 F.2d 1062, 1066 (3d Cir. 1991), citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27
comment d, at 255 (1982).  A judgment is final and valid when it has been rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction and the party against whom judgment is rendered has
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.  O’Leary, 923 F. 2d at 1066.  If an issue was
  UFL, in support of its position that the decision in the Eastern District of Virginia did2
not reach the merits, has relied on this Court’s prior decisions in Etten v. Lovell Man. Co., 225
F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1955) and Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 723 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1983). 
However, UFL’s reliance is misplaced.  Both of those cases dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for lack
of personal jurisdiction, as opposed to the instant matter that was dismissed for want of subject
matter jurisdiction.  The merits of whether or not the CDA applies to UFL’s claims have been
reached and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.
3
“critical to the judgment” it is not merely dicta and satisfies the condition of being
“essential to the judgment.”  Id. at 1067. 
Issue preclusion is intended to protect litigants from the dual burden of relitigating
an issue with the same party and the promotion of judicial economy through prevention of
needless litigation.  Id. at 1069, n.10 (citing Clark v. Troutman, 509 Pa. 336, 340 (1985)). 
Here, the issue to be precluded is the same as the one involved in an earlier action
in Virginia.  Second, the jurisdictional issue was actually litigated there, as the defendant
raised the jurisdictional issue based on the applicability of the Contract Disputes Act of
1978.   UFL submitted to the jurisdiction of the prior court as it filed its earlier lawsuit in2
the Eastern District of Virginia.  That court ruled that UFL’s claims were dependent on
rights plaintiff obtained through government-related contracts.  Thus, the issue of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction was properly raised by the pleadings, and it was essential to the
final judgment of the court.  Accordingly, the doctrine of issue preclusion would normally
prevent UFL from bringing the instant suit. 
4II.
UFL argues an exception to the doctrine that is outlined in Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 28 as follows:
although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of
the issue in the subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the
following circumstances:
(2) the issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve
claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new
determination is warranted in order to take account of an
intervening change in the applicable legal context or
otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws.
However, we believe our decision in O’Leary forecloses UFL’s attempt to argue
that the different “legal environment” between the original Virginia suit, and the instant
suit somehow suspends the usual considerations that underlie the doctrine of issue
preclusion. See Appellant’s Br. at 9 (“the law of issue preclusion . . . makes the preclusion
issue dependent upon the legal environment . . .”.).   
Plaintiff’s attempt to circumvent the jurisdictional bar that would arise because of
the possible operation of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 is both unconvincing and
unavailing.  UFL can not satisfy its burden under § 28(2) of establishing that the demand
it made in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania is so distinct from the
demand it made in the Eastern District of Virginia as to fall within the claim preclusion
exception embodied in § 28(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.  See
5Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 63 F.3d at 1234 ((“[A] fact, question or right
distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent action, even
[if] the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application
of the law.”)) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
III.
Accordingly,  we will affirm the Order of Dismissal of the Middle District of
Pennsylvania.
